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NOTES 
TERROR IN THE SKIES: 
WHO SHOULD PAY THE PRICE? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
International political terrorism1 is on the rise. It is a popular 
means among various groups for obtaining political legitimacy and 
for carrying out political objectives. 2 Among the diverse methods of 
attack,8 airport bombings• and aircraft hijackingsG appear to be the 
1. International political terrorism has been defined as "the systematic use of extreme 
violence and threat of violence in order to achieve public and political objectives." See Note, 
Towards a New Definition of Piracy: The Achille Lauro Incident, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 723 
(1986) (citing Mallison & Mallison, The Concept of Public Purpose Terror in International 
Law, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES 67 (M. Bassiouni ed. 1975)). Addi-
tionally, political terrorism has been defined as the: 
use, or threat of use, of violence by an individual or a group, whether acting for or 
in opposition to established authority, when such action is designed to create ex-
treme anxiety and/or fear-inducing effects in a tar.get group larger than the immedi-
ate victims with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to political de-
mands of the perpetrators. 
See Note, supra, at 723 (citing G. WARDLAW, POLITICAL TERRORISM 3 (1982)). 
2. A more concise definition of political terrorism has been offered, as "[t]he systematic 
use of murder, and destruction, and the threat of murder and destruction in order to terror-
ize individuals, groups, communities or governments into conceding to the terrorist's politi-
cal demands." See Note, supra note 1, at 723-24 (citing P. WILKINSON, TERRORISM AND THE 
LIBERAL STATE 49 (1977)) (emphasis added). For an excellent view of the problem of terror-
ism, see B. NETANYAHU, How THE WEST CAN WIN (1986). In addition, these various groups 
include the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its splinter groups, the Japanese 
Red Army, and the Italian Red Brigade. 
3. The diverse methods include kidnapping, hostage taking, sabotage, and attacks on 
diplomats. See generally MURPHY, PUNISHING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS 116 (1985). 
4. Airport Terrorists Kill 13 and Wound 113 at Israeli Counters in Rome and Vienna, 
N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1985, at Al, col. 6. During these two attacks, grenades and submachine 
guns were used. The attacks were directed towards crowds at the El Al check-in counters in 
the Rome and Vienna airports. Id. 
5. See N.Y. Times, June 15, 1985, at Al, col. 6 (reporting the hijacking of TWA flight 
847). Arab terrorists smuggled two hand grenades and two automatic pistols by X-ray ma-
chines and security guards at Athens International Airport in Athens, Greece. N.Y. Times, 
June 17, 1985, at A9, col. l; see also Four Killed as Bomb Rips TWA Plane on Way to 
Athens, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1986, at Al, col. 6. The Arab Revolutionary Cells, a splinter 
group of the PLO claimed responsibility. Id. They claimed that this bombing was a response 
in retaliation for American clashes with Libya in the Gulf of Sidra. Id.; see also N.Y. Times, 
Sept. 5, 1986, at A3, cols. 1, 2. 
In this attack, four men dressed as security guards and while firing machine guns, 
seized a Pan Am jumbo jet filled with approximately 400 people at Karachi airport in Paki-
stan. Id. Airport security in Pakistan is usually extremely tight for passengers, who are 
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terrorist's preferred method for expressing their demands. Since 
the 1960's, the vulnerability, visibility, and mobility of the aircraft 
has made it a favorite target for terrorists. 6 As a result, the airlines, 
as well as the innocent civilian victims, are forced to "pay the 
price" in the terrorists war against civilized society.7 
Air carrier liability for injuries to passengers on international 
flights is governed by the Warsaw Convention,8 as modified by the 
Montreal Agreement. 9 The articles of the Warsaw Convention at-
tempt to regulate international air carrier liability in a uniform 
manner by establishing a presumption of liability,10 by limiting lia-
bility,11 and by establishing defenses against liability.12 As a result 
searched by hand two or three times before boarding. Id. at A6, col. 4. It should be pointed 
out that the responsibility to guard the airport is that of the local government and not Pan 
Am's. Id. 
In another incident, Lebanese gunman attempted to hijack an Air Afrique jet. The 
cabin crew overpowered and captured the gunman after a French passenger was killed and a 
steward was critically wounded while the plane was on the tarmac at Cointrin Airport. N.Y. 
Times, July 25, 1987, at Al, col. 3. Also note that cruise ships are not free from the terrorist 
menace. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1985, at Al, col. 6. 
6. See Note, Keeping "The Wild" Out of "The Wild Blue Yonder": Preventing Terror-
ist Attacks Against International Flights in Civil Aviation, 4 DICK. J. INT'L L. 251 (1986). 
The fact that many air carriers are owned and operated publicly by state governments, 
rather than privately, is one reason why the aircraft is an extremely powerful symbol open 
to attack. In addition, an aircraft in flight, despite all of its engineering sophistication, is a 
uniquely fragile vessel once someone aboard threatens to use a weapon or explosive. For this 
reason, there will always be a compelling necessity to protect the lives of passengers, partic-
ularly since the air commerce system has become such an essential part of life in the twenti-
eth century. See id. at 252. 
7. See supra notes 4 and 5. 
8. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transpor-
tation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 
II [hereinafter Warsaw Convention]. 
9. Montreal Agreement CAB 18900, 31 Fed. Reg. 7, 302 (1966) [hereinafter Montreal 
Agreement]. For an excellent discussion on the background of the Warsaw Convention and 
the Montreal Agreement, see Lowenfeld & Mendelshon, The United States and The War-
saw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497 (1967). 
10. Warsaw Convention, supra note 8. Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention contains a 
presumption of liability for "damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a 
passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger . . . . " This presumption is 
rebuttable under Article 20(1) of the Convention. "The carrier shall not be liable if he 
proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that 
it was impossible for him or them to take such measures." See id. art. 20(1) (emphasis 
added). 
11. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 8. Article 22 of the Convention limits the lia-
bility of the carrier for each passenger to 125,000 francs. Id. This is equivalent to approxi-
mately $8,300. 
12. Id. art. 20. "The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents have 
taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him or them 
to take such measures." See also id. art. 21. "If the carrier proves that the damage was 
caused by or contributed to by the negligence of the injured person the court may, in accor-
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of the United States dissatisfaction with the low limit of liability, 
the Montreal Agreement was created.13 The Montreal Agreement 
increased the limits of liability for passenger recovery under the 
Warsaw Convention from $8,300 to $75,000, and replaced the Con-
vention's rebuttable presumption of liability with that of absolute 
liability .14 In order for a passenger to recover under the Warsaw 
Convention, his injuries must fall within the scope of article 17 .11 
Briefly, article 17 provides recovery for death or bodily injury sus-
tained if the accident took place on board the aircraft or in the 
course of embarking or disembarking.16 
Beginning in the early 1970's, the Popular Front for the Liber-
ation of Palestine (PFLP), among other groups, carried out attacks 
against passengers of airlines.17 For example, on September 6, 
1970, TWA Flight 100 was hijacked en route to New York City 
from Tel Aviv, by an armed member of the PFLP. The plane was 
diverted to a desert strip near Amman, Jordan, where the hostages 
spent six days before being moved to safety.18 Originating with this 
dance with the provisions of its own law, exonerate the carrier wholly or partly from his 
liability. Id. 
13. See Montreal Agreement, supra note 9. "The Montreal Agreement is a special con-
tract envisioned by article 22(1) of the Convention, whereby the carrier and the passenger 
may agree to a higher limit of liability. It is a private inter-carrier agreement in contrast to 
the Convention which is a public intergovernmental agreement." Reukema, Article 17 of the 
Warsaw Convention: An Accident is Required for Recovery, 10 ANNALS OF AIR AND SPACE L. 
191, 193 (1985). 
14. Reukema, supra note 13, at 193. 
15. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 8, art. 17; see also Comment, Deterring Air-
port Terrorist Attacks and Compensating the Victims, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1134, 1139 (1977). 
16. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 8, art. 17. 
17. See, e.g., Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973). In 
Burnett, a suit was filed by a husband and wife who were passengers on board a TWA flight 
scheduled to fly from Athens, Greece to New York. During the course of the flight, the PLO 
diverted the airplane and forced it to land in the desert near Amman, Jordan. The plaintiffs 
and other passengers were held captive for six days in the close confines of the airplane's 
cabin. The plaintiffs were deprived of regular food and water and subjected to the tempera-
ture extremes of the desert. Additionally, Mr. Burnett experienced swelling in his ankles, 
and the couple feared that their lives were in danger. The Burnett's claimed to have suf-
fered emotional trauma. The court found that the Warsaw Convention does not provide 
recovery for mental anguish. Id.; see also Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 351 F. Supp. 702 
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973) (Husserl I) (mental injuries 
alone are not comprehended by article 17); Herman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 69 Misc. 
2d 642, 330 N.Y.S.2d 827 (2d Dep't 1972), rev'd sub nom. Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, 
34 N.Y.2d 385, 314 N.E.2d 848, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974); Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, 
Inc., 40 A.D.2d 963, 338 N.Y.S.2d 664 (2d Dep't 1972), rev'd, 34 N.Y.2d 385, 314 N.E.2d 848, 
358 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974) (Warsaw Convention does not support a claim that psychological 
trauma alone is compensable). Cf. Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (Husserl JI) (mental injuries alone are comprehended by article 17). 
18. See, e.g., Rosman, 40 A.D.2d 963, 338 N.Y.S.2d 664, rev'd, 34 N.Y.2d 385, 314 
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event, a trend developed whereby victims of terrorist hijackings 
brought suit against the airline under the Warsaw Convention for 
mental and emotional injuries sustained during hijackings.19 
At the outset, American courts attempted to interpret article 
17 of the Warsaw Convention, specifically whether the French "le-
sion corporelle" or "bodily injury" encompassed mental injury as 
well. 20 While the issue is still not settled, on the whole, courts have 
held that personal injuries suffered by a passenger, both physical 
and mental, are recoverable under the Convention. 21 In addition, 
courts have found that according to the Convention, airlines are 
liable for terrorist attacks in airports when the passenger is in the 
course of embarking or disembarking.22 
In the wake of the recent terrorist hijackings23 and the Rome 
and Vienna airport bombings, 24 it appears that a greater focus 
should be turned toward airline liability today. While the Warsaw 
Convention and Montreal Agreement provide a cap on recovery for 
airline accidents per se, they are not adequate systems for dealing 
N.E.2d 848, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97. 
19. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
20. See id.; see also Stanculesco, Recovery for Mental Harm Under Article 17 of the 
Warsaw Convention: An Interpertation of Lesion Corporelle, 8 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. 
REV. 339 (1985). 
21. Krystal v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1322 (C.D. Cal. 1975) 
(Montreal Agreement permits recovery for mental distress); Husserl II, 388 F. Supp. at 
1238; Palagonia v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 110 Misc. 2d 478, 422 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1978) 
(lesion corporelle includes the concept of mental injury as a recoverable damage, even in 
absence of physical manifestation). 
22. Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd, 
550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977); Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y.), 
aff'd, 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976), aff'g In re Tel Aviv, 405 
F. Supp. 154 (D.P.R. 1975). In both Day and Evangelinos, a terrorist raid occurred while 
passengers were in the Transit Lounge of the Hellinkon Airport in Athens, Greece. The 
attack occurred after the passengers had surrendered their tickets, passed through passport 
control and entered an area reserved exclusively for those about to depart on international 
flights. The passengers were in the course of "embarking" within the terms of the Warsaw 
Convention. Evangelinos, 396 F. Supp. at 95; Day, 393 F. Supp. at 217; see also Mache v. 
Air France, Judgment of June 3, 1970, at 140, Cass. civ. lre, Fr., __ Bull. Civ.I --· 24 
R.F.D.A. 311 (1970). The plaintiff sustained personal injuries when led by two Air France 
stewardesses. He took a shortcut through an area located beyond the traffic apron but not 
inside the terminal building. The court held that the plaintiff had completed the operations 
of disembarking when he stepped off the traffic apron. The Mache court limited the scope of 
disembarking to passage across the runway. See Comment, supra note 15, at 1144. 
In MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1971), the plaintiff completed her 
international flight and walked through the terminal to the baggage-claim area where she 
fell to the floor and was injured. The court held that the plaintiff's injury had occurred 
beyond the scope of article 17, because she had reached a safe point inside the terminal. Id. 
23. See supra note 5. 
24. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1985, at Al, col. 6. 
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with terrorism which has become a major force in disrupting the 
normal workings of Western society. 
This Note, in Part II, will discuss the Warsaw Convention and 
the Montreal Agreement. Part III will focus on article 17 and the 
established law on airline liability for terrorist attacks, and Part IV 
will discuss alternative solutions to the present Warsaw Conven-
tion when dealing with terrorism. This Note will conclude that air-
lines should not be held to a standard of absolute liability when 
dealing with terrorist attacks. Rather, it will be suggested that an 
international fund be set up, financed by the various governments, 
airlines, and passengers. This fund will be used to both compen-
sate victims and to relieve the airlines from being the sole compen-
sator and a victim itself. 
II. BACKGROUND ON THE WARSAW CONVENTION AND 
MONTREAL AGREEMENT 
On October 19, 1929, the Convention for the Unification of 
Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air was 
completed and open for signature in Warsaw, Poland. 26 It has sub-
sequently become known as the Warsaw Convention. The Warsaw 
Convention was designed to ensure a certain degree of uniformity 
of legal obligation in the aviation industry26 as well as to protect 
the "fledgling" aviation industry from disastrous damage suits. 27 
The goal of uniformity was achieved by the creation of a cause of 
action28 and a uniform body of liability rules governing interna-
tional aviation. 29 The protection from disastrous suits was achieved 
25. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 8; see also Note, The Emotional Trauma of 
Hijacking: Who Pays?, 74 KY. L. J. 599, 602 (1986). "The Warsaw Convention was the result 
of two international conferences held in Paris in 1925 and Warsaw in 1929, and of the work 
done by the interim Comite International Technique d'Experts Juridique Aeriens (CITEJA) 
created by the Paris Conference." Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 9, at 498. Also note 
that the original text of the Convention is in French. 
26. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 9, at 498. "[S]ince aviation was obviously 
going to link many lands with different languages, customs, and legal systems, it would be 
desirable to establish at the outset a certain degree of uniformity." Id. 
27. See Reukema, supra note 13, at 192; see also Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 
9, at 499-500. "The Convention established internationally the rule that carriers are liable 
for damage sustained by a passenger in the course of a flight or while embarking or dis-
embarking (Article 17), but limited this liability to 125,000 Poincare francs - approximately 
8,300 United States dollars." Id. at 499. This limit was even low for 1929. Id. 
28. See Reukema, supra note 13, at 192 (citing Benjamins v. British European Airways, 
572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979)). The Warsaw Convention 
creates a cause of action for wrongful death. Id. 
29. This new body of law was intended to supersede the numerous conflicting domestic 
laws. Id. 
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by placing a monetary limit on the carrier's liability for personal 
injury, 30 damage to cargo31 and baggage32 in exchange for a pre-
sumption of liability on the part of the carrier.83 
In 1934, when the United States adhered to the Warsaw Con-
vention, the liability limit per passenger for personal injuries was 
approximately $8,300.84 During the 1950's and 1960's the United 
States became dissatisfied with this low limit of liability and pro-
posed revisions to the existing convention. 36 In 1955, at a confer-
ence in The Hague, there was an agreement on doubling the limit 
of personal injuries. 36 In 1956, the United States signed the Hague 
Protocol, however the Senate never ratified it, claiming that the 
level of damages available to Americans traveling abroad was still 
too low.87 On November 15, 1965, the United States issued a for-
mal notice of denunciation of the Warsaw Convention to be eff ec-
tive May 15, 1966. 88 
In order to avoid U.S. withdrawal, a conference was convened 
in the Spring of 1966 in Montreal.89 On May 14, 1966, the day 
In Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977), a bomb on 
an airplane exploded and action was brought against the corporate officers of the air carrier 
charging negligent failure to institute a satisfactory security system. Id. The court held that 
the plaintiffs could not recover from the air carrier's employees or from the air carrier a sum 
greater than that recoverable in suit against the carrier itself, as limited by the Warsaw 
Convention. Id. 
30. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 8, art. 22(1). Article 22(1) provides that the 
carrier shall be liable up to the limited sum of 125,000 francs or its equivalent. Id. 
31. Id. art. 22(2). Article 22(2) provides that the carrier's liability shall be limited to a 
sum of 250 francs per kilogram, unless a special declaration of the value at delivery is made 
by the consignor and a supplementary sum has been paid if required. Id. 
32. Id .. Article 22(2) applies to checked baggage, while article 22(3) applies to un-
checked baggage. For unchecked baggage, the liability of the carrier shall be limited to 5,000 
francs per passenger. Id. 
33. Id. art. 17. Article 17 applies to personal injury. Article 18 applies to damage done 
to cargo and baggage. 
34. See Reukema, supra note 13, at 192. 
35. Id. at 193. 
36. Newman & Barrows, Legal Remedies Available to Hijack Victims of TWA Flight 
847, 194 N.Y.L.J., July 18, 1985, at 2, col. 3. 
Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. A press release announcing the denunciation provided: 
The United States would be prepared to withdraw the notice of denunciation de-
posited today if, prior to its effective date of May 15, 1966, there is a reasonable 
prospect of an international agreement on limits of liability in international air 
transportation in the area of $100,000 per passenger or on uniform rules but with-
out any limit of liability, and if, pending the effectiveness of such international 
agreement, there is a provisional arrangement among the principal international air-
lines waiving the limits of liability up to $75,000 per passenger. 
39. Lowenf eld & Mendelsohn, supra note 9, at 563. 
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before the effective date of its denunciation, the United States 
withdrew its notice of denunciation and announced an interim 
agreement known as the Montreal Agreement. "0 The purposes of 
the Montreal Agreement was to impose absolute liability"1 on the 
signing carriers for all deaths or injuries involving international 
travel to and from the United States."2 In addition, the Agreement 
raised the limit of liability under the Warsaw Convention to a 
maximum of $75,000 per passenger, including attorney's fees." 3 
Moreover, the Montreal Agreement changed the liability re-
gime of the Warsaw Convention.•• The Convention contained a 
presumption of liability for "damages sustained in the event of the 
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suf-
fered by a passenger .... ""6 This presumption was rebuttable if the 
carrier could show that all necessary measures were taken to avoid 
the damage or that it was impossible for the carrier to take such 
measures. "6 However, according to the Montreal Agreement, the 
carrier could no longer use the "all necessary measures" defense."7 
Thus, a new no-fault absolute liability standard was developed. 
This means that the carrier will be liable whenever circumstances 
as set forth in article 17 are met,"8 no matter who caused the dam-
age. •9 Furthermore, under the Montreal Agreement, the circum-
40. Id.; see also Newman & Barrows, supra note 36, at 2, col. 3. 
41. Absolute liability is liability in all instances regardless of fault. The Montreal 
Agreement provides in pertinent part that, "[t]he carrier shall not, with respect to any claim 
arising out of the death, wounding, or other bodily injury of a passenger, avail itself of any 
defense under article 20(1) of said Convention or said Convention as amended by said Pro-
tocol." See Note, supra note 25, at 607. 
42. Note that the Montreal Agreement is not as broad as the Warsaw Convention and 
applies only to flights having a nexus with the United States. See Newman & Barrows, 
supra note 36, at 2, col. 3. For example, the passengers aboard TWA Flight 847 were sched-
uled to return to the United States after stopping in Rome. Thus, the Montreal Agreement 
was applicable. However, it did not apply to those Greek citizens who had Rome as their 
final destination and no connection to the United States. Id. at 2, col. ·4. 
43. Id. at 2, col. 3. 
44. Reukema, supra note 13, at 193. 
45. Warsaw Convention, supra note 8, art. 17. 
46. Id. art. 20(1). 
47. Montreal Agreement, supra note 9, art. 1(2). 
48. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 8, art. 17. The circumstances set forth in arti-
cle 17 are that there is a death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suf-
fered, as a result of an accident on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the opera-
tions of embarking or disembarking. 
49. Under the Montreal Agreement, liability is absolute rather than strict. Under strict 
liability, a causal link is required between the person held strictly liable and the damage. 
Hence such defenses as acts of third parties and acts of God will survive when liability is 
strict. See Reukema, supra note 13, at 194. Also note that the defense of contributory negli-
gence specified in Article 21 of the Warsaw Convention survives under the Montreal Agree-
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stances under which liability arises do not change. Thus, the acci-
dent that caused damage must take place on board the aircraft or 
during embarkation or disembarkation60 as set forth in article 17. 
III. ARTICLE 17 AND ESTABLISHED LAW FOR AIRLINE 
LIABILITY FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS 
In order to trigger application of the Warsaw Convention and 
Montreal Agreement, a passenger's injuries must fall within the 
terms of article 17. 61 Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention states 
the circumstances under which airlines are required to compensate 
injured passengers. 62 The article provides that: 
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of 
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suf-
fered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so 
sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any 
of the operations of embarking or disembarking.68 
The article does not create a cause of action but merely establishes 
a presumption of liability under the applicable substantive law.64 
Under the Warsaw Convention, courts have found that the 
burden is on the plaintiff to prove that there was an accident. 66 
The article 17 accident requirement is a way to ensure that there is 
no liability for injuries that arise from internal causes.66 _Accord-
ment's liability regime, and does not detract from the absolute quality since an absolute 
liability system can provide for exemptions in specified circumstances. Id. 
50. Warsaw Convention, supra note 8, art. 17. 
51. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 8, art. 17; Note, supra note 25, at 610. 
52. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 8, art. 17. 
53. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 8, art. 17 (emphasis added). 
54. See Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) 
(Husserl II); see also Frippando, Warsaw Convention - Federal Jurisdiction and Air Car-
rier Liability for Mental Injury: A Matter of Limits, 19 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 59, 
61 (1985). The Warsaw Convention was interpreted as providing uniform rules regarding 
proper forum, applicable law, statute of limitation, effect of a passenger's contributory negli-
gence and limitations on liability. Id. These uniform rules did not apply unless the passen-
ger's domestic claim satisfied the conditions for liability imposed by article 17, including 
that the claim involved death, wounding, or other bodily injury. Id. at 62. 
55. See Husserl II, 388 F. Supp. at 1238. As stated by District Judge Tyler, "for an 
injury to be comprehended by the Warsaw Convention it must have been proximately 
caused by an accident; hence, to establish liability, one must prove proximate causation and, 
likewise, must prove his actual injuries and their worth." Id. 
56. Reukema, supra note 13, at 206. A passenger cannot recover if his injury is purely 
an internal reaction to the usual, normal and expected operation of the aircraft. Thus, if a 
passenger with a history of heart attacks has a heart attack in flight, or a person who has 
had a stroke has a seizure on board, then as long as the onset of the medical problem is not 
due to an unexpected or unusual event during the flight, the carrier will be excused from 
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ingly, it has been held that a hijacking, terrorism in airports, and 
other criminal acts of third parties are accidents as defined by arti-
cle 17.67 In Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co. Ltd.,68 for example, 
suit was brought against an airline for bodily and mental injuries 
suffered during a terrorist hijacking.69 The airline argued that if 
the cause of the damage was intentional then it was not an acci-
dent and the Warsaw Convention was not applicable. 60 The court 
found that there was no logical basis to distinguish between sabo-
tage61 and hijacking, and since sabotage was considered an acci-
dent under the Convention, then so must hijacking.62 In addition, 
the court concluded that if the airline was not held liable in hi-
jacking cases, then the function of the Warsaw Convention and 
Montreal Agreement to redistribute the costs in air transportation 
would be defeated. 63 
A. THE INTERPRETATION OF "BODILY INJURY" 
The most litigated provision under the Warsaw Convention is 
whether a passenger can recover for mental injuries sustained as a 
result of a hijacking. 6" One of the main reasons for this litigation is 
the fact that the Warsaw Convention is written in French and 
courts are divided as to the appropriate meaning of lesion 
corporelle.66 Another reason for this litigation is that the intent of 
liability. Id. 
57. Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd per 
curiam, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973) (Husserl I). It should be noted that airline hijackings 
were "probably not within the specific contemplation of the parties at the time the Warsaw 
Convention was promulgated . . .. " Id. 
58. 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (Husserl II). 
59. Id. at 1242. 
60. Id. at 1243. 
61. Sabotage has been defined as the "malicious destruction of or damage to property 
with the intention of injuring a business or impairing the economic system or weakening a 
government or nation ... . " WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1995 (1981). 
62. Husserl II, 388 F. Supp. at 1238. 
63. Id. 
64. See Newman & Barrows, supra note 36, at 2, col. 3. Part of this problem is the fact 
that the official Warsaw Convention is written in French. Article 17 is at issue where the 
phrase, "en cas de mort, de bessure ou de toute autre lesion corporelle" has been translated 
as " in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger, or any other bodily injury." Id. 
Additionally, it should be noted that the Convention creates a cause of action for wrongful 
death. See Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979). Thus far there have been fewer wrongful death actions filed for 
terrorist hijackings than emotional distress actions. 
65. See Stanculesco, supra note 20, at 339. There has been much debate on this issue. 
See, e.g., Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973); Husserl v. 
Swiss Air Transp. Co., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 485 F.2d 1240 
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the drafters of the Convention is not clear,66 and the question re-
mains as to whether the drafters envisioned terrorism and hijack-
ings as being a menacing force in aviation in the 1980's.67 
Without a clear understanding of the term lesion corporelle, it 
is difficult to determine from what injuries a passenger may re-
cover. 68 If the injuries are not comprehended by the Convention, 
they may not be subject to the Convention's limits on liability.69 
Thus, in such cases where mental injuries are sustained, and are 
not comprehended by the Convention, the plaintiff will not be en-
titled to the airline's liability of $75,000 and may not have absolute 
liability available as provided by the Montreal Agreement. 70 
Following a series of terrorist aircraft hijackings in September 
of 1970, a number of suits were brought by passengers on planes 
diverted to the Jordanian desert, seeking to recover from the air-
lines for injuries received in the course of the hijackings. 71 On the 
whole, these injuries were not physical in nature, such as broken 
arms and legs, but rather psychological and emotional. 72 In Bur-
nett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,73 the plaintiffs were on such a 
hijacked flight. 7" They were held captive for six days in the air-
plane's cabin and were deprived of regular food and water.75 Addi-
tionally, Mr. Burnett experienced swelling in his ankles, and the 
couple feared that their lives were in danger.76 As a result, the 
Burnetts claimed to have suffered severe emotional trauma. 77 
The District Court of New Mexico strictly construed the War-
(2d Cir. 1973) (Husserl I); Palagonia v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 110 Misc. 2d 478, 442 
N.Y.S.2d 670 (1978); Herman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 69 Misc.2d 642, 330 N.Y.S.2d 
827 (2nd Dep't 1972), rev'd sub nom. Rosman v. Trans. World Airlines, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 385, 
314 N.E.2d 848, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974); Rosman v. Trans World Airlines Inc., 40 A.D.2d 
963; 338 N.Y.S.2d 664 (2d Dep't 1972), rev'd, 34 N.Y.2d 385, 314 N.E.2d 848, 358 N.Y.S.2d 
97 (1974). The courts in all these cases attempt to interpret lesion corporelle, and distin-
guish it from lesion mentale. 
66. See Note, supra note 25, at 614. The court in Rosman states that the study of the 
minutes of the Warsaw Convention indicated that the drafters did not define or discuss 
what was meant by article 17 and whether physical injury is a bodily injury. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. See cases cited supra note 65; Husserl II, 388 F. Supp. at 1238. 
69. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 8, art. 17. 
70. See Newman & Barrows, supra note 36, at 2, col. 3. 
71. See cases cited supra note 65. 
72. Id. 
73. 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973). 
74. Id. at 1153. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
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saw Convention by determining that the French legal meaning of 
"bodily injury" applied and that French law distinguished between 
bodily injury and mental injury under the terms of the Conven-
tion.78 However, the court left open a wide area in allowing recov-
ery for mental injuries by stating that "emotional distress ... di-
rectly precipitated by [a] bodily injury [would be] considered as 
part of the bodily injury itself. "79 
In 197 4, the New York Court of Appeals decided Rosman v. 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. 80 and Herman v. Trans World Airlines, 
Inc .. 81 The plaintiffs in Rosman and Herman were among the pas-
sengers on board the same hijacked TWA flight as Burnett. 82 Mrs. 
Rosman claimed that she had suffered a backache, swollen feet, 
and discoloration of her legs and back resulting from immobility.88 
Her two children claimed to have developed skin irritations and 
boils from lack of sanitary facilities, and the scarcity of food and 
water caused her and the children substantial weight loss and de-
hydration. 84 Similarly, Mrs. Herman claimed that she slept little, 
lost much weight, became extremely frightened and developed a 
skin rash. 86 Both plaintiffs claimed "severe psychic trauma. "86 The 
court found this type of trauma to be natural, noting that "while 
none of them alleged to have been shot, struck or personally as-
saulted by any of the hijackers, the plaintiffs, all Jewish, naturally 
feared that their lives were in grave danger."87 However, the cen-
tral controversy in Rosman concerned the meaning of "bodily in-
jury" and whether it encompassed both physical and mental injury 
or harm. 88 The court held that the pla!ntiffs could off er proof at 
trial and recover for "palpable, objective bodily injuries suffered on 
the aircraft, irrespective of impact. "89 However, the plaintiffs could 
not off er proof or recover "for psychic trauma alone. "90 
78. Id. at 1155. The court determined that because the Warsaw Convention was drafted 
in French, the French legal meaning of bodily injury applied. Id. 
79. Id. at 1158. 
80. 34 N.Y.2d 385, 314 N.E.2d 848, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974). 
81. 40 A.D.2d 850, 337 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1972), rev'd sub nom. Rosman v. Trans World 
Airlines Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 385, 314 N.E.2d 848, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974). 
82. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
83. 34 N.Y.2d at 389, 314 N.E.2d at 848, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 99. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 396, 314 N.E.2d at 848, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 99. 
89. Id. at 397, 314 N.E.2d at 848, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 99. 
90. Id. But see Batalia v. State of New York, N.Y.2d 176, N.E.2d 729, 10 N.Y.S.2d 237 
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The broadest reading of lesion corporelle was found in Hus-
serl v. Swiss Air Transport Co. (Husserl In.91 Mrs. Husserl was a 
passenger on a Swiss Air flight from Zurich, Switzerland to New 
York on September 6, 1970.92 In flight, a group of Arab terrorists 
hijacked the airplane and directed the pilot to fly to the desert 
near Amman, Jordan. 98 The passengers were forced to remain on 
the plane for "24 hours under circumstances less than ideal for 
physical or mental health. "9" The women and children passengers 
were moved to a hotel in Amman where they stayed until Septem-
ber 11th. Mrs. Husserl arrived in New York on September 13th.95 
As a result of the hijacking, Mrs. Husserl claimed that she suffered 
"bodily injury and severe mental pain and anguish resulting from 
her expectations of severe injury and/ or death .... "96 She did not 
claim to be physically injured. 97 
As with Burnett and Rosman, in Husserl II the court had to 
determine whether mental injuries were compensable under the 
"any other bodily injury provision of article 17. "98 The court 
looked at the intent of the draftsmen concerning the inclusion of 
mental anguish in article 17. 99 The court reasoned that "the Par-
ties probably had no specific intention at all about mental and psy-
chosomatic injuries because, if they had, they would have clearly 
expressed their intentions."1°0 Additionally, the court found no evi-
dence that the draftsmen "intended to preclude recovery for any 
particular type of injury."101 Therefore, the court concluded that in 
order to have uniform liability of air carriers, "the types of injuries 
enumerated should be construed expansively to encompass as 
many types of injury as are colorably within the ambit of enumer-
ated types. Mental and psychosomatic injuries are colorably within 
that ambit and are thus comprehended by article 17. "1o2 
Following in the footsteps of the court in Husserl II, the Dis-
trict Court of California and the New York Supreme Court held 
(1961) (allowing recovery for psychic trauma without physical injury). 
91. 388 F. Supp. at 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
92. Id. at 1242. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 1249. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 1250. 
102. Id. 
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mental injuries to be compensable under the Warsaw Convention. 
In Krystal v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 103 the Krystals were 
passengers on a British Overseas flight scheduled to fly from Bom-
bay, India to London, England. 104 The airplane was diverted by 
hijackers to Amsterdam, Holland.106 The Krystals sued the airline 
claiming damages for mental distress resulting from fright, anxiety, 
stress, fear and loss of sleep. 106 The court denied the defendant's 
motion for summary judgment, holding that mental injuries are 
compensable under article 17 as a matter of law.107 
Similarly, in Palagonia v. Trans World Airlines,108 the plain-
tiff brought action against the airline seeking damages for psychic 
or mental damage arising from a hijacking on an international 
flight. 109 Once again the issue revolved around the expression 
"bodily injury," and as in Husserl II, the court found that lesion 
corporelle includes the concept of mental injury as a recoverable 
damage even without physical manifestations.110 
B. AIRPORT ATTACKS - DEFINING EMBARKING AND DISEMBARKING 
Passengers in air terminals may be in more danger now than 
before the advent of strict airport security.m This is particularly 
true since the December 1985 bombings at the Rome and Vienna 
airports.112 Equally relevent to this issue is the extent to which the 
airline may be liable for injuries received within the terminal. m 
The status of such liability may be determined by construing "the 
operations of embarking or disembarking" phrase in article 17.114 
However, since article 17 provides no guidance as to when embark-
ing or disembarking takes place, the courts are left to decide this 
issue for themselves. 
In Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 116 and Evangelinos v. 
103. 403 F. Supp. 1322 (C.D. Cal 1975). 
104. Id. at 1322. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 1323. 
107. Id. at 1324. 
108. 110 Misc. 2d 478, 442 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1978). 
109. 110 Misc. 2d at 478, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 670. 
110. Krystal, 403 F. Supp. at 1324. 
111. See Comment, supra note 15, at 1134. This is because aircrafts are less attractive, 
targets resulting from tight and effective security measures. Id. 
112. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1985, at Al, col. 6. 
113. See Comment, supra note 15, at 1134. 
114. Warsaw Convention, supra note 8, art. 17. 
115. 393 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 890 (1976). 
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Trans World Airlines, Inc.,116 the Second and Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals allowed recovery for injuries sustained in the Hel-
lenikon Airport attack of 1973.117 On August 5, 1973, at Hellenikon 
Airport in Athens, Greece, two Palestinian terrorists "hurled three 
grenades and unleashed a salvo of small-arms fire into a line of 
passengers preparing to board TWA Flight 881 to New York."118 
The passengers had gone through several of the required boarding 
procedures, and were attacked while they were standing in line at 
the departure gate waiting to be searched by a TWA 
representative. 119 
The inajor issue in the Day and Evangelinos cases was 
whether the passengers sustained their injuries "in the course of 
. . . the operation of embarking. "120 TWA argued that there 
should be no liability under the Warsaw Convention while the pas-
senger was still inside the terminal building.121 The court in Day 
rejected this "location of the injury" test in favor of an "activity" 
approach. 122 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals applied a tripar-
tite test based on the activity (what the plaintiffs were doing), con-
trol (at whose direction) and location.128 The court reasoned that 
the passengers were acting at the express direction of TWA's 
agents.12• They were not free to roam at will through the terminal 
but were required to stand in line at the direction of TWA's agents 
for the purpose of undergoing a weapons search which was a pre-
requisite to boarding. m Thus, the plaintiffs were in the course of 
116. 396 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd, 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977) (en bane). 
117. Day, 528 F.2d at 32. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. Briefly the boarding procedures were as follows. After entering the terminal, 
the passenger would present his ticket, deposit his luggage, and pay a departure tax at the 
check-in counter of his chosen airline. At the check-in counter, he would be given a boarding 
pass and baggage check. The passenger would then proceed through Greek passport and 
currency control and descend a flight of stairs into the Transit Lounge. (It should be noted 
that only passengers waiting to board international flights would be allowed inside the 
lounge area where they were required to remain until boarding.) While waiting for his flight, 
the traveler would secure his seat assignment, and when his flight was announced, he would 
proceed to the designated departure gate where he and his hand luggage would be searched 
by Greek police. The passenger then would go through the doors of the terminal building 
and cross a short terrace outside. Finally, he would board a bus which would transport him 
to the waiting plane. Id. 
120. Day, 528 F.2d at 33 (quoting Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention). 
121. Id. at 33. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
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embarking.126 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Evangelinos agreed 
with the result in Day but stated that its reasoning "differed 
slightly."127 The court placed less weight upon carrier control over 
passengers than did the court in Day.128 "While control remains at 
least equally as important as location and activity, it is an integral 
factor in evaluating both location and activity. A standard based 
primarily upon these three factors seems best calculated to effect 
the policies underlying article 17."129 Thus, the Warsaw Conven-
tion applied. 130 
However, in Martinez Hernandez v. Air France,1 81 a debarka-
tion case, the First Circuit Court of Appeals applied the tripartite 
test of Day and found that the airline could not be held liable for a 
terrorist attack which occurred in the baggage pickup area.182 In 
Martinez Hernandez, three Japanese terrorists boarded a plane in 
Rome. 133 On arrival at Lod Airport in Israel, the plane stopped 
about one-third to one-half mile from the terminal building.134 The 
passengers descended movable stairs to the ground and then rode a 
bus to the terminal.136 They presented their passports for inspec-
tion to Israeli immigration officials and then went into the main 
baggage area of the terminal.186 While the passengers were waiting 
for their baggage, three Japanese terrorists removed their luggage 
from the conveyor belt and opened fire upon persons in the bag-
gage area, killing and wounding several.137 The court stated that 
the passengers were "free agents roaming at will through the ter-
minal" and that since the airline personnel had no control over 
them, the airline was not liable under the terms of the Warsaw 
Convention.138 
126. Id. at 34. 
127. Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines Inc., 396 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Pa. 1975), reu'd, 
550 F.2d 152, 155 (3d Cir. 1977). The court also noted that there is a substantial interest in 
uniformity of decision in this area. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. 545 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1976). 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 281. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. The District Court of Puerto Rico cited MacDonald v. Air Canada, as control-
ling precedent that the attack did not occur during disembarkation. MacDonald v. Air Can-
ada, 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1971). In MacDonald, a passenger fell in the baggage pickup 
15
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IV. DISTRIBUTING THE COSTS - AN ALTERNATIVE TO 
ABSOLUTE LIABILITY 
As has been previously noted, the Montreal Agreement im-
poses absolute liability on the air carrier in the event of an acci-
dent,139 which has been held by courts to include terrorism140 and 
hijacking.141 However, what has failed to be recognized is that ter-
rorist acts are not ordinary "accidents" in the sense of airplane 
crashes, fires or pressure problems, but rather, are a product of the 
times and a "risk which accompanies international travel."142 As a 
result, a provision regarding terrorist attacks, both in the airport 
and in the air, should be encompassed in a supplemental provision 
to the Montreal Agreement.143 This provision should provide an al-
ternative to absolute liability and should redistribute the costs that 
the airline would ordinarily be subjected to under the present 
system.144 
A. THE SECURITY ISSUE 
Under the present system, absolute liability is justified on the 
theory that for the time period when the passenger is under the 
airline's control, the airline could best prevent injuries from occur-
ring.146 Subsequently, the argument follows that the airline should 
area. Id. at 1402. Similarly, the court in In re Tel Aviv found the "operation of disembark-
ing terminated by the time the passenger had descended from the plane by the use of 
whatever mechanical means have been supplied and has reached a safe point inside the 
terminal." In re Tel Aviv, 405 F. Supp. 154, 156 (D.P.R. 1975). 
139. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 8, art. 17. 
140. Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 396 F. Supp 95 (W.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd, 
550 F.2d 152 (3d. Cir. 1977); Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y.), 
aff'd, 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert denied, Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 351 F. Supp. 
702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973). 
141. Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973); Rosman 
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 A.D.2d 963, 338 N.Y.S.2d 664 (2d Dep't 1972), rev'd, 34 
N.Y.2d 385, 314 N.E.2d 848, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974). 
142. Evangelinos, 550 F.2d at 159 (Seitz, J., dissenting). 
143. See Montreal Agreement, supra note 9, at 302. 
144. The present system is the Warsaw Convention as modified by the Montreal Agree-
ment. See supra notes 25-50 and accompanying text. 
145. See Reukema, supra note 13, at 202. But see N.Y. Post, Jan. 17, 1987, at 12, col. 1. 
A mock hijacking was conducted by the Indian Government to test the airline security sys-
tem. As a result, the Indian Government is in a better position to prevent injuries from 
occurring. But c.f. N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1986, at A9, col. 1. The Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) recognizes the need for increased security, and security technologists have de-
vised a new method for "thwarting the smuggling of bombs aboard aircrafts." Id. In addi-
tion, there is an increase in different types of terrorist weapons , making security an even 
more difficult job. The plastic gun, for example, is being tested by the United States Army. 
Id. The small metal parts of such firearms and cartridges would produce X-ray images, but 
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provide tighter security to guard against the risk of terrorist at-
tacks.146 However, the question remains as to what standard an 
airline should be held to. El Al, the Israeli national airline, for ex-
ample, has the tightest security of any airline in the Western 
world.147 This security system has minimized incidents, but has not 
prevented them.148 Since the 1960's, El Al has encountered spo-
radic ground attacks and limited effects of cargo hold explosions. 149 
Briefly, El Al's security consists of devices under the airplane's 
wings to protect against surface to air missiles by altering their 
flight through electronic means.160 Thus far, no other airline uses 
this device.m Additionally, El Al conducts interrogation152 during 
baggage inspections. The baggage in the cargo hold goes through 
an initial search and then is placed inside armored altitude cham-
bers from which air is pumped out to simulate the drop in atmo-
spheric pressure as the plane gains altitude. 153 The purpose of this 
is to double check that the bags do not contain an explosive rigged 
to go off when the pressure drops.1H Furthermore, the magnetome-
ter test is often supplemented by frisking. m 
With respect to U.S. airline security, Pan Am has one of the 
most extensive security programs in the industry.156 Pan Am 
screens passengers, employees, airport facilities, baggage and the 
aircraft with unrelenting thoroughness.167 In addition, they have 
devised a plan called ALERT, in which the company works in close 
cooperation with security and military forces provided by the gov-
their outlines on fluoroscope would be difficult to identify. Id. Also note that the FAA 
adopted an amendment to the Federal Aviation Regulations on the Transportation of Fed-
eral Air Marshals, providing that Federal Air Marshals be used aboard high-risk flights. 
Amendment 108-2, 50 Fed. Reg. 27,924 (1985) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 108). 
146. Under the common-law rule, a carrier owes his passenger an extraordinary duty of 
care. See Comment, supra note 15, at 1157. 
147. N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1985, at A4, col. 3. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. There is a great deal of interrogation before one passes the baggage check 
point. Israeli security inquires into the destination and purpose of the passenger's trip. In 
one instance an interrogator called a young girl's stepmother to verify the reason why she 
was making the trip. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. It should be noted that in Israel, the Israeli Government has total control over 
security. However, they must defer their security to foreign governments in foreign airports. 
Id. 
156. N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1986, at A6, col. 4. 
157. Id. 
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ernments of the United States and other countries.168 
It should also be mentioned that security at foreign airports is 
the responsibility of the local government and not the airline.169 
Thus, for example, in the Hellenikon airport attack in Athens, 
Greece, the airport was guarded by the Greek Government and the 
preboarding physical searches were required and controlled by the 
Greek police.160 It is doubtful that the airline could have prevented 
the terrorist attack. 161 Therefore, it is questionable whether TWA 
should be held liable for the terrorist attack because the Greek 
Government failed in its security responsibilities.162 
B. THE DEEP POCKET APPROACH 
It has been suggested by the court in Day that the air carrier 
pay for the passenger's injuries, because it would be preferable to 
allocate the costs of the terrorist attack among the entire popula-
tion of air travelers, rather than to require the victim to bear the 
expense alone.163 The court in Day assumes that the "corporate 
defendants have more than ample financial resources. "16" However, 
the pockets ·of international airlines may not be as deep as the 
158. Id. 
159. Id. As a result of this, the International Security and Development Act of 1985 was 
enacted. See International Security and Development Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-83, § 
551(b)(l), 99 Stat. 225 (1985). It requires the FAA to inspect security at all foreign airports 
where American travelers might be in jeopardy. Id. As a result of these federal security 
requirements, 185 foreign airports are subjected to airport security assessments. See SEMI-
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY PRO-
GRAM, Jan. 1-June 30, 1986 (Nov. 1986). The assessments are conducted on a regularly 
scheduled basis with emphasis on those locations posing the greatest threat to civil aviation 
security. Id. at 6. 
Airport security in Pakistan is extremely tight; passengers are searched two or three 
times by hand before boarding. N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, at A6, col. 1. In the hijacking of Pan 
Am Flight 73 on Sept. 4, 1986, the failure of airport security was not Pan Am's fault but 
rather that of the local government of Karachi. Id.; see also N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1986, at 
A3, cols 1, 2. Also note that security in Rome is handled by a mixed force of the regular 
national police and the caribinieri, the paramilitary police corps under the Defense Minis-
try. N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1986, at A8, col. 4. 
Moreover, the U.S. Government has passed legislation which officially authorizes the 
executive branch to issue a travel advisory whenever a country after 90 days notice, fails to 
improve airport security to a level equivalent to, "at a minimum, the standards and appro-
priate recommended practices contained in Annex 17 to the ICAO Convention." See Note, 
supra note 6, at 272. 
160. Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977). 
161. See Comment, supra note 15, at 1153. 
162. Id. 
163. Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d at 31 (2d Cir. 1975). 
164. See Comment, supra note 15, at 1153. 
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court believes.161 Hijacking has had an adverse financial effect on 
international air carriers.166 Conceivably, such liability could halt 
flights to destinations where terrorist attacks are likely, in fear that 
liability to passengers would be a financial catastrophe.167 
Specific flights may even be avoided aitogether.168 For exam-
ple, as a result of the 1985 terrorist attacks, Americans were chang-
ing their travel plans or staying home.169 According to tourism offi-
cials, bookings to Greece,170 Egypt, 171 Israel, 172 and Italy173 have 
sharply decreased. In Britain, there has been a 30 percent decline 
since the Achille Lauro hijacking and airlines are offering free 
flights and excursions to boost business. 174 
The courts have allocated the cost of terrorist attacks to the 
airlines without considering the equities of the burden. Even 
though the protection of the injured passenger is guaranteed, the 
requirement that airlines should have to pay the price for attacks 
which they are powerless to prevent could, inevitably, lead to a re-
duction of air service which is both damaging to the airline indus-
try and to tourism. 
C. GOVERNMENT LIABILITY 
Airlines are said to be a source of "national pride and a 
method of world wide advertising; so much so that many countries 
maintain their national airlines with subsidies in the face of stag-
165. Id. 
166. Id. In 1974, Pan Am lost over $80 million. TWA lost international operations as 
well as did Japan Airlines, Alitalia, and Air France. Id. at 1155. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. Note also that a move was underway by the International Airline Pilots Associ-
ation to boycott governments found responsible for terrorist acts. N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1986, 
at A8, col. 4. A country would be boycotted if it encouraged, financed, trained or harbored 
terrorists. Id. 
169. On Terrorism and Tourism: Americans Alter Travel Plans, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 
1986, at Al, col. 1. Travel agents reported a surge of interest in American and other Western 
Hemisphere destinations. Id. American Express reported increased bookings to Disneyland 
and other domestic attractions, as well as to South America. Id. 
170. Id. at A13, col. 1. In 1985, Greece lost $100 million in tourist revenue as a result of 
the TWA hijacking, and bookings in 1986 were expected to be half of that in 1985. Id. 
171. The Egyptian tourist industry was in ruins after the 1985 terrorist incidents and 
the Achille Lauro hijacking. Id. 
172. In 1986, half as many Americans traveled to Israel after Arab terrorists hijacked a 
TWA jet out of Athens. Until the terrorist attacks, American tourism had been running 25 
percent ahead of previous years. However, despite the American tourist decline, El Al's traf-
fic has remained level. This is due to their widely recognized "tough security stance." Id. 
173. Hotel cancellations in Italy were 30 percent and growing. Id. 
174. Id. 
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gering deficits that would bankrupt any other corporation.m75 This 
thought leads one to suggest that perhaps the individual govern-
ments should be liable to the injured passengers. 
Government bodies control, own, and manage many of the 
world's major airports,176 and very often in state-owned airports, 
security is provided by police agencies. 177 A victim of a terrorist 
attack "should be able to recover from the host government if the 
injuries are a result of the government's negligence in providing 
protection. "178 Additionally, governments are better able to spread 
the costs over the taxable population,179 where there is a govern-
mental interest in promoting tourism and stimulating foreign in-
vestment and commerce.180 
Moreover, a sense of responsibility would help create an inter-
est in rigorous security measures at international airports.181 By 
imposing liability on international airlines for airport attacks, some 
nations may become lax in their airport security measures, thus 
holding the "wealthy" airlines responsible for preventing at-
tacks.182 Therefore, if the terrorist was stopped at the gate by an 
adequate government security system, there would be no threat of 
a hijacking and no need to hold the airline liable for the injuries 
resulting from one. 
175. Comment, Warsaw Convention Limitations on Air Carrier Liability: A Critical 
View, 17 INT'L AM. L. REV. 591 (1986). 
176. Id. at 1163. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. However, this also brings up the question of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., 
Comment, supra note 15, at 1160. "To avoid offending other governments by unfair or abu-
sive claims of sovereign immunity, nations often agree by treaty or contract to waive immu-
nity from suit for their business enterprises which operate abroad." Id. at 1161. "This wav-
ier allows airport attack victims to overcome the sovereign immunity barrier and sue the 
foreign government if that government's responsible agency did business in the United 
States." Id. at 1162. However, a waiver of sovereign immunity can be overridden by the 
State Department according to U.S. foreign affairs law. Id. 
179. Id. at 1160. It could be argued that the costs of injuries associated with air travel 
should be borne by airline passengers alone. However, the benefits of air transportation 
extend to many others. The entire community benefits from the profits of tourist spending, 
airline supply, and foreign currency. Id. 
180. Id. at 1156. 
181. Id.; see also supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
182. See Comment, supra note 15, at 1155; see also BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. 
DEP'T OF STA1"E, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, SPECIAL REP. 
No. 149 (July 1986). Economic sanctions may be used to pressure targeted states to change 
their policies against terrorism. Id. At the Tokyo economic summit, seven participating 
heads of government agreed in their Declaration on International Terrorism that: "Terror-
ism has no justification .... [It] must be fought effectively through determined, tenacious, 
discreet and patient action combining national measures with international cooperation." 
Id. 
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D. COMPENSATION RELIEF - A PROPOSAL 
Thus far, this Note has examined the applicability of the War-
saw Convention and Montreal Agreement in compensating victims 
of various aviation mishaps.183 Particularly, the focus has been on 
terrorist attacks, and the difficulty the courts have encountered in 
interpreting Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention in relation to the 
injuries suffered as a result of these attacks. 184 Additionally, the 
most common arguments have been presented explaining why the 
airlines, and perhaps the governments, should be held liable to the 
victims. 186 However, at present there appears to be no adequate 
solution for alleviating the burden of total liability placed upon the 
airline. Thus, it is recommended that an international compensa-
tion fund be established to lessen the financial burden imposed 
upon the airline, which usually has no control over the terrorist 
attacks. 186 
Aircraft hijackings and airport bombings are crimes of our 
time. However, they are not uncontrollable if those whose interests 
are affected - governments, carriers, and the traveling public - are 
willing to take the necessary measures no matter how inconvenient 
they may be. 187 The proposed fund is such a necessary measure. 188 
Under a tripartite contribution fund, a percentage of the passen-
ger's ticket, matched by the airline's donation and the govern-
ment's allowance, would combine to compensate victims and to as-
sist the airline. 
As early as 1974, Justice Stevens lent support to this idea in 
his dissent in Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 189 Justice Ste-
vens stated that even as victims of crime are compensated by local 
governments, nations could, and perhaps should, create and con-
183. See supra notes 8-147 and accompanying text. Aviation mishaps include liability 
for personal injury, damage to cargo and baggage. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying 
text. 
184. See supra notes 51-147 and accompanying text. 
185. These common arguments are that the airline should provide tighter security, that 
the airline can best afford the expense or the deep-pocket approach, and that the govern-
ments should be held liable. See supra notes 148-92 and accompanying text. 
186. See supra notes 154-71 and accompanying text. 
187. See Evans, The Law and Aircraft Hijacking, 1 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 273 
(1973). The author suggests that rigorous security measures, not only searches, but fines for 
careless carriers or dilatory airports, can be effective. Id. As a result, it could be argued that 
this statement could be broadly construed to include an international compensation fund 
for victims of terrorist attacks. 
188. See supra notes 51-192 and accompanying text. 
189. Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc, 34 N.Y.2d at 385, 404, 314 N.E.2d 848, 859, 
58 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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tribute to a fund which would compensate victims of hijackings.190 
Moreover, the need for such a fund can find support in the 
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986.191 
The act provides compensation to government employees and 
members of their families who are victims of terrorism.192 Addi-
tionally, the act calls for strict security safeguards and for interna-
tional cooperation for the maintenance of effective airport secur-
ity .193 Clearly, such international cooperation could be extended 
one step further in developing a new compensation system. 
1. A Suggested Scheme 
The New York Crime Victims Compensation Fund19• and the 
International Fund for Oil Pollution Damagem are two existing 
funds which can serve as models for the proposed International 
Compensation Fund. The Crime Victims Compensation Fund was 
enacted in 1966 in reaction to a fatal stabbing of a passenger on a 
New York City subway.196 This fund was an attempt to apply an 
ancient remedy to a contemporary problem.197 
The Victim's Compensation Fund is designed to give govern-
mental financial assistance to victims of crime.198 In order to grant 
the award, the board members must find that there was a crime 
committed, that the crime directly resulted in personal physical in-
190. Id. 
191. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399, 
§ 801, 100 Stat. 853 (1986). 
192. Id. at 857. This act establishes a Diplomatic Security Service to perform security 
functions, including .those of investigation, warrant, and arrest. It also authorizes funds for a 
five year program to upgrade or rebuild U.S. facilities abroad for security reasons, and com-
pensation for government employees and members of their families who are victims of ter-
rorism. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 620 (McKinney 1982). 
195. International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Oil 
Pollution Damage, in 11 l.L.M. 284 (1972) [hereinafter Fund Convention]. 
196. See Weinstein, Crime Victims Compensation, 17 N.Y.L.F. 145 (1972). In October 
of 1965, Arthur Collins, a passenger on a New York City subway, attempted to eject a man 
who was annoying two women. The man resisted and Collins was stabbed to death in front 
of his wife and child. Collins was earning $6,000 a year at the time of his death. His em-
ployer paid his family one month's salary and then hired his wife. As a Good Samaritan 
measure, the New York City Council awarded Mrs. Collins $4,200 per year for the rest of 
her life. Id. 
197. See id. Justice Weinstein notes that the subject of compensating victims of crimes 
can be traced back 4000 years to Hammu-rabis Code. 
198. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 620 (McKinney 1982). "[l]t is the legislature's intent that aid, 
care and support be provided by the state, as a matter of grace, for such victims of crime." 
Id. 
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jury or death of the victim, and that the crime was promptly re-
ported to the authorities.199 Additionally, the fund provides awards 
for loss of earnings or support, and reduces the amount of pay-
ments to the victim if the victim receives additional compensation 
from insurance, other public funds, from the person who commit-
ted the crime, or through emergency awards. 200 
Adapting this fund to the present proposal would be possible, 
since the situations are almost identical. The New York Victim's 
Compensation Fund compensates victims of a crime, and airline 
passengers are victims of terrorist hijackings. Moreover, the New 
York fund only allows compensation for bodily injury which is sim-
ilar to the article 17 provision allowing recovery for "death or 
wounding or bodily injury. "201 
The second model fund is the International Fund for Oil Pol-
lution Damage. It was developed as a result of the "catastrophic 
grounding" of the supertanker, the Torrey Canyon, off the coast of 
England. 202 The shipwreck ruined the beaches and holiday resorts 
on both sides of the English Channel and destroyed animal, bird 
and marine life as well as lucrative fisheries. 203 As a result, new 
international regimes of liability and compensation for damages 
caused by oil pollution on the high seas and in coastal areas were 
established. 
One system was set up by two international conventions under 
the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization 
(IMC0).20" These conventions include the International Conven-
tion of Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC),206 and its 
partner, the International Convention on the Establishment of an 
International Fund for Oil Pollution Damage (Fund Conven-
tion).206 The CLC is based on strict vessel owner liability.207 If the 
claimant can show actual fault on the part of the owner, then the 
199. Id. § 631. 
200. See id. § 631(4). 
201. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 8, art. 17. 
202. See Goldie, Concepts of Strict and Absolute Liability and the Ranking of Liabil-
ity in Terms of Relative Exposure to Risk, 6 NETH. Y.B. lNT'L L. 177, 198 (1985). 
203. Id. 
204. See Jacobsen, Oil Pollution: The 1984 London Protocols and the AMOCO CADIZ, 
15 J. MAR. L. & COM. 467 (1984). 
205. See International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, in 9 
I.L.M. 45 (1970) [hereinafter CLC]. 
206. See Fund Convention, supra note 195. 
207. See Jacobson, supra note 204, at 473. The owner can be found liable up to a speci-
fied monetary limit, regardless of fault. Id. 
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liability becomes unlimited.208 This convention also provides a lim-
ited number of affirmative defenses including "acts of war, acts of 
God, acts or omissions of third parties with intent to cause dam-
age, the claimant's intentional or negligent acts or omissions, and 
governmental negligence regarding navigational aids. "209 
After the approval of the CLC, it was obvious that adequate 
compensation was not available for claimants in case of cata-
strophic spills. 210 Thus, the Fund Convention was adopted as a 
supplement to the CLC. 211 ·The organized fund is comprised of an 
Assembly, a Secretariat headed by a Director, and an Executive 
Committee elected by the Assembly.212 Specifically, the financing 
of the Fund Convention is provided by mandatory contributions 
from the oil companies. 218 The contribution amounts are assessed 
on the basis of the number of tons of oil annually received at ports 
and terminals of the states subscribing to the Fund Convention.214 
The main purposes of the Fund Convention are to: 
1. provide additional compensation for damages and clean-up 
costs over and above the shipowner's liability; 
2. to indemnify the shipowners and their insurers for addi-
tional burdens that the Convention may impose on them .... 
3. achieve a more equitable distribution of the costs of oil pol-
lution damage among the interests participating in the transporta-
tion of oil and its derivatives; and 
4. to compensate victims for injuries which may not be within 
the scope of harms covered by the Liability Convention. 216 
Moreover, the Fund Convention has no obligation if it is shown 
that the pollution damage was a result of hostilities or war, or that 
the oil escaped from a state owned or operated ship used for gov-
208. Id. Liability is imposed only on the owner of a ship. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 474; see also Goldie, supra note 202, at 202. Goldie states that as a result of 
the increased number of oil spills, the CLC's maximum limits failed to reflect realistic sums 
for covering the costs of such disasters. Id. "They were not only insufficient in amount, but 
were inconsistent in certain areas 'including the scope of coverage.'" Id. 
211. See Jacobson, supra note 204, at 474. The Fund Convention provided additional 
compensation for clean up costs and damages above the tanker owner's liability under the 
CLC. Id. 
212. See Goldie, supra note 202, at 200. The Executive Committee is elected by the 
Assembly on the basis of geographical distribution and the quantity of oil received by the 
States so qualifying. Id. 
213. Id. at 201. 
214. See Jacobson, supra note 204, at 475. 
215. Id. at 474. 
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ernment non-commercial service. 216 Secondly, the Fund Conven-
tion is not liable if the pollution damage was a result of negligence 
on the part of the claimant. 217 
Another form of recovery, voluntary agreements, are devised 
by oil companies and tanker owners.218 These voluntary liability 
agreements are the Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concern-
ing Liability for Oil Pollution (TOV ALOP)219 and the Contract Re-
garding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollu-
tion (CRISTAL).220 These agreements provide forms of recovery to 
national governments or individuals for clean-up costs in certain 
pollution cases. 221 However, even with these two supplementary 
agreements, slight inadequacies exist in this system. 222 
At a Diplomatic Conference in 1984, the Secretary General of 
IMCO requested that the participating States consider and adopt 
three draft proposals to revise the CLC and the Fund Conven-
tion. 223 The main goal of the Protocols was to raise the liability 
limits of ships.22• Subsequently, on May 25, 1984, the CLC and 
Fund Convention Protocols were adopted. 2H 
· Once again, a comparison can be drawn between an oil spill 
catastrophe and a hijacking or terrorist attack which can be classi-
fied under the same level of severity. The CLC's liability limits are 
analogous to the Warsaw Convention and Montreal Agreement lia-
bility limitations, as well as absolute liability standard. The CLC 
has even taken a similar historical course to that of the Warsaw 
Convention in its attempts to raise liability limitations as viewed 
by the 1984 Conference. Moreover, the Fund Convention's organi-
zational structure could be adopted so that an "Assembly" would 
allocate the Fund's resources. Such decisions would have to be 
216. Goldie, supra note 202, at 201. 
217. Id. at 201-02. 
218. See id. at 202. 
219. Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution, re-
printed in 8 I.L.M. 497 (1969). 
220. Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution, 
reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 137 (1971). 
221. See Jacobson, supra note 204, at 471-72. 
222. See id. at 472; see also Goldie, supra note 202, at 202. 
223. See Goldie, supra note 202, at 203. The three drafts were (1) a Convention on 
Liability and Compensation in Connection with the Carriage of Noxious and Hazardous 
Substances by Sea; (2) a Protocol to Revise the International Convention on Civil Liability 
for Oil Pollution Damage; (3) a Protocol to Revise the International Convention on the Es-
tablishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage. Id. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
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made concerning the compensation to be paid to the victim, the 
increase cost of passenger tickets and the percentage of contribu-
tion from them, as well as the amount of airline contribution and 
of governmental support. 
The New York Legislature, by enacting the Victim's Compen-
sation Fund, recognized that many innocent people suffer personal 
physical injury or death as a result of criminal acts, and that there 
is a need for governmental financial assistance for such victims of 
crime. Similarly, the international community should recognize the 
need for a fund to assist the airlines in making compensation pay-
ments to passenger victims. Clearly, this is a small "price to pay" 
in order to maintain international travel in this age of terrorism. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In August of 1985, five of the U. S. citizens on TWA Flight 
847, who were taken hostage in Lebanon by Shiite Moslems, filed 
lawsuits against the airline.226 These actions were commenced al-
most two months after the hostages' release.227 The reasons given 
for their delay were that there was sympathy among the hostages 
and potential jurors for the airline.228 In addition, the hostage fam-
ilies did not have the "moral indignation" to sue because they 
thought the TWA crew performed well. 229 Moreover, research has 
shown that half of the potential jurors think that hostages should 
just forget about their ordeal and be happy they are alive. 230 
It is with this thought in mind that a change is needed in the 
present system. The courts for the most part have determined that 
mental injury is recoverable under Article 17 of the Warsaw Con-
vention.231 Additionally, the courts have defined embarking and 
disembarking.232 However, they have failed to recognize that there 
is an unfair burden being placed upon the airline industry - a bur-
den which only governments can control. While it is not proposed 
226. Tarr, Five Ex-Hostages Sue TWA; Some Settlements Reached, NAT'L L.J ., Sept. 
2, 1985, at 6, col. 1. The lawsuits claimed that TWA should have kept the terrorists and 
their weapons off the plane. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. TWA's outside counsel said that this suggested that the passengers were not 
angry with TWA. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. But see Darsch v. TWA, 85-3234-MA, stating that the plaintiffs were more 
interested in suing to promote air travel safety than in collecting damages. 
231. See supra notes 93-116 and accompanying text; see also Warsaw Convention, 
supra note 8. 
232. See supra notes 117-47 and accompanying text. 
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that the present system be eliminated, a modification is needed in 
order to balance the costs between the airlines, the passengers, and 
the governments. 
It has been suggested that the proposed Airline Liability Com-
pensation Fund be modeled after the New York Victim's Compen-
sation Fund and the International Fund for Oil Pollution Dam-
age. 283 The Airline Liability Compensation Fund would only apply 
to terrorist acts in the airport or on the aircraft, thus the action 
would still have been recoverable under Article 17 of the Warsaw 
Convention for the victim to receive compensation. 23" Once it is 
determined that the airline is liable for the bodily injury, then the 
victim may recover a percentage from the compensation fund. 236 
The purposes of the fund should be clearly set forth and should 
both adequately compensate the victim passenger according to the 
terms of the Warsaw Convention while still alleviating the airline 
from the total financial burden of victim compensation. 236 
Cheryl B. Feldmus 
233. See supra notes 207-39 and accompanying text. 
234. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. 
235. Depending upon the agreed allocation scheme, the victim may recover all or a per-
centage from the fund. This would have to be decided at an international conference. See 
Fund Convention, supra note 195. 
236. Note that as does the Warsaw Convention, this proposal would apply only for in-
ternational flights. In addition, the reasons for the price increase should be made known to 
the public. Also note that a common insurance fund has been proposed as a recovery system 
for air accidents. See Note, A Proposed Revision of the Warsaw Convention, 57 IND. L.J. 
297, 318 (1982). "When an air accident occurs, full and just compensation can be derived 
from the fund." Id. 
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